来源：国政学人

　　期刊简介

　　《国际关系》（International Relations）是国际关系领域的顶尖期刊之一，由SAGE出版社与大卫·戴维斯纪念研究所（David Davies Memorial Institute）联合出版编辑，2021-2023年影响因子为1.6，SSCI排名为56/96。

　　本期目录

1

　　将国家利益与民粹主义机遇相结合：对欧洲极右翼的干预政治

　　Fitting national interests with populist opportunities: intervention politics on the European radical right

2

　　欧盟对俄战略的战略文化与竞争愿景：灵活适应、合作威慑和精准对抗

　　Strategic culture and competing visions for the EU’s Russia strategy: flexible accommodation, cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation

3

　　“反恐战争”全球化？对36个国家的分析 

　　Globalising the ‘war on terror’? An analysis of 36 countries

4

　　选择性人道主义者：区域和冲突认知如何推动国内危机的军事干预

　　Selective humanitarians: how region and conflict perception drive military interventions in intrastate crises

5

　　处理国际政治中的内疚和耻辱

　　Dealing with guilt and shame in international politics

　　内容摘要

　　将国家利益与民粹主义机遇相结合：对欧洲极右翼的干预政治

　　题目：Fitting national interests with populist opportunities: intervention politics on the European radical right

　　作者：Toby Greene，巴伊兰大学政治研究系讲师，研究重点是外交政策决策、欧洲外交政策以及中东和巴以问题的国际政治。

　　摘要：随着欧洲极右翼政党的影响力不断扩大，外交和安全政策也越来越政治化，这些政党越来越有可能影响各国关于国际事务的辩论。本文展示了极右翼反对党如何根据这些困境在特定国家环境中所带来的政治机遇的性质，寻求利用围绕军事干预的政策困境。研究结果基于对法国、德国和英国的叙利亚内战干预辩论中国民阵线、德国选择党和英国独立党所做反应的定性比较案例研究。本文发现，不干预并不是极右翼政党的绝对价值。虽然自由人道主义干预遭到一致反对，但以国家安全为由的干预，无论是打击“圣战”威胁还是防止失控的移民，都会引发一系列受国内政治背景影响的反应。然而，即使这些政党支持干预选举，他们的言论也侧重于将问题纳入其政治议程的民粹主义层面，尤其是攻击主流对手的无能、口是心非或前后矛盾，以及未能保护国家主权和民族完整。

　　As European radical right parties grow in influence, and as foreign and security policy becomes more politicised, these parties have increasing potential to shape national debates on international affairs. This paper shows how radical right opposition parties seek to exploit policy dilemmas surrounding military intervention according to the nature of the political opportunity these dilemmas present in specific national settings. Its findings are based on qualitative comparative case studies of Front National, AfD and UKIP responses to intervention debates surrounding the Syrian civil war in France, Germany and the UK. I find that non-intervention is not an absolute value for radical right parties. Whilst liberal-humanitarian interventions are uniformly rejected, interventions on national security grounds, whether to combat Jihadist threats or prevent uncontrolled migration, prompt a range of responses shaped by the domestic political context. Yet even where these parties back intervention in votes, their discourse focuses on fitting the issue to the populist dimensions of their political agenda, especially attacking mainstream rivals for incompetence, duplicity or incoherence, and failing to protect the sovereignty and ethnic integrity of the nation.

　　欧盟对俄战略的战略文化与竞争愿景：灵活适应、合作威慑和精准对抗

　　题目：Strategic culture and competing visions for the EU’s Russia strategy: flexible accommodation, cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation

　　作者：Paul Silva II，宾夕法尼亚大学政治学博士，研究重点是国际关系理论、经济制裁、联合国大会投票模式、民主化以及欧盟作为国际政治参与者的角色。

　　摘要：本文分析了2009年至2018年期间欧盟成员国的国家安全战略，并提出了欧盟成员国对俄罗斯采取的三种安全战略——灵活适应、合作威慑和有针对性的对抗。本文将战略文化假设与现实主义和商业自由主义假设进行对比，以解释欧盟成员国对俄罗斯安全战略的变化。虽然现实主义的解释会预测地理位置上靠近俄罗斯的欧盟成员国将拥有更多的对抗性安全战略，但地理位置接近和对俄罗斯的对抗性安全战略并不呈正相关。与俄罗斯的双边经济相互依存关系、欧盟成员国执政联盟中民粹主义政党的存在以及欧盟成员国在冷战期间的结盟或被占领国家地位也无法解释欧盟成员国对俄罗斯的安全战略。欧盟成员国对俄政策的差异，一种更为一致的解释是围绕相关国家的战略文化。与更具欧洲主义观念的国家相比，更具大西洋主义观念的国家往往与俄罗斯发生更多对抗，无论它们与俄罗斯在地理上接近还是经济上相互依存。

　　This article analyzes the national security strategies of EU member states in the 2009–2018 period, and conceptualizes three security strategies EU member states have adopted toward Russia – flexible accommodation, cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation. It tests strategic culture hypotheses against those of realism and commercial liberalism to explain the variation of EU member states’ security strategies toward Russia. While a realist explanation would predict EU member states geographically proximate to Russia would possess more confrontational security strategies, geographic proximity and confrontational security strategies toward Russia are not positively correlated. Bilateral economic interdependence with Russia, the presence of populist parties in EU member states governing coalitions, and EU member states’ alignment or status as an occupied state during the Cold War also do not explain EU member states’ security strategies toward Russia. A more consistent explanation of the variance in EU member states’ policy on Russia revolves around the strategic culture of the state in question. States with a more Atlanticist perspective tend to be more confrontation with Russia than their more Europeanist counterparts, regardless of geographic proximity or economic interdependence with Russia.

　　“反恐战争”全球化？对36个国家的分析

　　题目： Globalising the ‘war on terror’? An analysis of 36 countries

　　作者：Tobias Ide，默多克大学政治与国际关系高级讲师，研究兴趣为气候变化、自然资源和环境政治与和平、冲突和安全的交集。

　　摘要：反恐战争作为一种话语，认为恐怖主义是全球范围内的重大威胁，主要由伊斯兰网络所助长，需要国际社会作出强有力的回应。这种话语对国内和国际政治都产生了巨大影响。因此，大量研究分析了反恐战争话语所依据的假设和合法化政策。然而，现有的研究大多集中在一个或几个案例上，主要是在全球北部。本文介绍了一个新数据集，其中包含2003年至2014年期间36个国家（占世界人口的约64%）学校教科书中的反恐战争话语信息。基于此数据集，作者首次全面分析了反恐战争话语的全球传播。研究发现，反恐话语并没有全球化，而主要局限于欧洲和北美的发达国家。因此，美国的软实力和恐怖主义话语的超全球化存在明显的局限性。恐怖主义强度、武装冲突和独裁政权等因素几乎没有预测能力。尽管受到挑战的（独裁）政权有明显的动机去适应反恐战争的话语，但情况仍然如此。与批判性安全和恐怖主义研究中的普遍假设相反，反恐战争话语几乎与强调恐怖分子的非理性和仇恨或社会政治不满的边缘化无关。

　　The rise of populism in Western democracies creates presumed threats on liberal international order. Although a number of scholarly works are dedicated to the populist challenge on liberal democracy, the analysis of populism’s implications on the liberal order is limited. This paper deliberates on a concise review of the consequences of populism on the Western liberal order. In order to delineate the study, the article is devoted to the Western populism and its implications on liberal order. The paper, while analyzing the components of liberal international order by drawing on the analytical framework of structural liberalism, intends to claim that populism has adverse consequences on certain elements of the order than others. However, the implication is not an inflection point for the Western liberal order. Furthermore, this paper also provides some explanations behind the limitations of the populist threats to the Western liberal order. The main argument to highlight is that populism is detrimental more to liberal democracy than to the liberal order itself, and the Western liberal order has the capacity to withstand the tide of populism.

　　选择性人道主义者：区域和冲突认知如何推动国内危机的军事干预

　　题目：Selective humanitarians: how region and conflict perception drive military interventions in intrastate crises

　　作者：Sidita Kushi，布里奇沃特州立大学政治学助理教授，研究兴趣为国际关系、国际安全、定量方法、比较政治、军事干预等。

　　摘要：为什么一些国内暴力危机比其他危机更有可能引发人道主义军事干预？各国似乎对一些国内冲突（如科索沃）进行了强有力的干预，但在达尔富尔等更激烈的冲突中却没有采取类似的选择。关于这种“选择性差距”的研究大部分都集中在普遍规范或地缘政治利益上。然而，本文认为这些干预的选择性是区域差异与冲突认知相互作用的产物。本文介绍了1989年至2014年期间近1000次国内武装冲突的观察结果，国际军事反应和其他方面反应，以及反映军事干预强度的干预指数。本文发现，一旦国内武装冲突达到了人类苦难的临界点，强国就会进行干预，这取决于冲突是否发生在西方势力范围内，以及是否被称为身份认同战争。西方国家没有基于身份的内战认知，因此最有可能引发人道主义军事干预。这些结论对于国际政治中规范和利益所起的作用（受地区影响）以及军事干预作为一种政策选择具有重要意义。 

　　Why are some violent intrastate crises more likely to prompt humanitarian military interventions than others? States appear to intervene robustly in reaction to some internal conflicts, such as Kosovo, but withhold similar options in more intense conflict, as in Darfur. Much of the research on this ‘selectivity gap’ focuses on universal norms or geopolitical interests. I, however, argue that the selectivity of these interventions is a product of regional variations interacting with conflict perceptions. This paper introduces a dataset of almost 1000 observations of intrastate armed conflict between 1989 and 2014, paired with international military responses and non-responses, as well as an Intervention Index that accounts for the intensity of military interventions. I find that once a threshold of human suffering is met via the existence of an internal armed conflict, powerful states will intervene depending on whether the conflict occurs in the Western sphere of influence and whether it is denoted as an identity war. A Western region coupled with no perceptions of identity-based civil war prompts the greatest odds of humanitarian military intervention. Such conclusions carry implications on the role of norms and interests in international politics, as biased by region, and for military intervention as a policy choice.

　　处理国际政治中的内疚和耻辱

　　题目：Dealing with guilt and shame in international politics

　　作者：Lotem Bassan-Nygate，威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校政治学博士，研究兴趣为国际关系、政治心理学和实验方法的交叉领域；Gadi Heimann，耶路撒冷希伯来大学国际关系教授，研究领域是以色列外交政策史、国际体系中的大国地位。

　　摘要：国家和非国家行为者经常试图激起罪恶感和羞耻感等道德情感，以动员政治变革。然而，“点名羞辱”等策略往往效果不佳，这表明决策者介入违反规范时会采取尽量减少使用道德情感的方式。作者认为，在违反规范时，决策者通过应对机制来处理罪恶感和羞耻感，这些机制使他们能够推行与其道德标准相悖的政策。本文将罪恶感和羞耻感概念化为两种不同的现象，它们会引发不同的反应。羞耻感更有可能引发否认和歪曲等不成熟的防御，而罪恶感则会激起更成熟的补偿性反应。通过研究以色列建国后第一个十年政治议程上的两个关键问题，为这一理论提供了实证证据。本文使用来自三个不同政治论坛的一系列主要资料，分析了关于巴勒斯坦难民返回和以色列与西德赔偿协议的政治辩论。

　　State and non-state actors often try to provoke moral emotions like guilt and shame to mobilize political change. However, tactics such as `naming and shaming’ are often ineffective, suggesting that policy makers engage in norm violations in ways that minimize moral emotions. We argue that when violating norms, decision makers deal with guilt and shame through coping mechanisms that allow them to pursue policies that contradict their moral standards. We conceptualize guilt and shame as two separate phenomena that provoke distinct reactions. Shame is more likely to provoke immature defenses like denial and distortion, while guilt provokes a more mature and reparative reaction. We provide empirical evidence for this theory by examining two crucial issues on the state of Israel’s political agenda during the first decade of its existence. We analyze political debates over the return of the Palestinian refugees and the reparation agreement between Israel and West Germany, using a series of primary sources from three different political forums.

　　编译 | 邹梓轩

　　审校 | 宋欣蔚

　　排版 | 张嘉益

　　本文源于《国际关系》，本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。